

## Document 1

...shortly before Hiroshima, I became attached to General MacArthur in Manila, and lived for two months with his staff. In this way I learned something of the invasion plans and of the sincere conviction of these best-informed officers that a desperate and costly struggle was still ahead. Finally, I spent the first month after V-J Day in Japan, where I could ascertain at first hand both the physical and the psychological state of that country. Some of the Japanese whom I consulted were my scientific and personal friends of long standing.

From this background I believe, with complete conviction, that the use of the atomic bomb saved hundreds of thousands – perhaps several millions – of lives, both American and Japanese; that without its use the war would have continued for many months; that no one of good conscience knowing, as Secretary Stimson and the Chiefs of Staff did, what was probably ahead and what the atomic bomb might accomplish could have made any different decision. Let some of the facts speak for themselves.

*Was the use of the atomic bomb inhuman?* All war is inhuman. Here are some comparisons of the atomic bombing with conventional bombing. At Hiroshima the atomic bomb killed about 80,000 people, pulverized about five square miles, and wrecked an additional ten square miles of the city, with decreasing damage out to seven or eight miles from the center. At Nagasaki the fatal casualties were 45,000 and the area wrecked was considerably smaller than at Hiroshima because of the configuration of the city.

Compare this with the results of two B-29 incendiary raids over Tokyo. One of these raids killed about 125,000 people, the other nearly 100,000.

*Was Japan already beaten before the atomic bomb?* The answer is certainly “yes” in the sense that the fortunes of war had turned against her. The answer is “no” in the sense that she was still fighting desperately and there was every reason to believe that she would continue to do so; and this is the only answer that has any practical significance.

## Document 2

As the National Museum of the U.S. Navy makes clear, the atomic bombs had little to do with the end of the war. The museum's display on the bombings unambiguously states that the atomic bombings "made little impact on the Japanese military. However, the Soviet invasion of Manchuria ... changed their minds." As shocking as this may be to Americans today, it was well known to military leaders at the time. In fact, seven of America's eight five-star officers in 1945 said that the bombs were either militarily unnecessary, morally reprehensible, or both.

General Dwight Eisenhower voiced his opposition at Potsdam. "The Japanese were already defeated," he told Secretary of War Henry Stimson, "and it wasn't necessary to hit them with that awful thing." Admiral William Leahy, President Harry Truman's chief of staff, said that the "Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender...The use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan."

By the summer of 1945, Japan was desperate. Food and energy were in short supply. The transportation system was in tatters. Following the defeat at Saipan in July 1944, many Japanese leaders realized the war could not be won militarily. In February 1945, Prince Konoe, the former prime minister, wrote to Emperor Hirohito, "I regret to say that defeat is inevitable."

...[Additionally], the dreaded Soviet invasion proved, once and for all, the bankruptcy of both Japan's diplomatic and military strategies and, as the U.S. Navy Museum acknowledges, brought down the final curtain on the war. The atomic bombs contributed next to nothing to U.S. victory, but they did slaughter hundreds of thousands of civilians and they did initiate a process that threatened to ultimately bring down the final curtain on mankind.

Peter Kuznik, [www.usnews.com](http://www.usnews.com) 2016

### Document 3

The United States' objective in the war had been laid down publicly by President Roosevelt at the Casablanca Conference in early 1943: the unconditional surrender of all its enemies, allowing both for the occupation of their territory and the imposition of such new political institutions as the Allies saw fit. In the early summer of 1945 those terms had indeed been imposed upon Germany. But as a brilliant 1999 study by Richard B. Frank, *Downfall*, showed, the Japanese government—while well aware that it could not win the war—was not at all ready to accept such terms. They particularly wanted to avoid an American occupation of Japan, or any change in their political institutions.

Knowing that U.S. forces would have to invade the island of Kyushu before moving to Honshu and Tokyo itself, the Japanese planned a huge, costly battle on Kyushu that would inflict enough casualties to convince Washington to compromise. More importantly, as an excellent study of U.S. intelligence showed in 1998, the Japanese had in fact managed to reinforce Kyushu very heavily, and military authorities in Washington knew it. . .

. . .As it turned out, the combination of the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the entry of the USSR into the war against Japan—all within a period of just three days—convinced the Emperor and the Japanese government that surrender was the only option. [E]vidence has shown, however, that Japan would not have surrendered on American terms before an invasion took place in the absence of the atomic bombs.

The United States, then, dropped the bombs to end the war that Japan had unleashed in Asia in 1931 and extended to the United States at Pearl Harbor—and thereby probably avoided an invasion that would have meant hundreds of thousands of casualties. Frank also argued in *Downfall* that many thousands of Japanese civilians would also have starved in the meantime.

<http://time.com/4346336/atomic-bombs-1945-history/>

## Document 4

...Within the first few months after the bombing, it is estimated by the Radiation Effects Research Foundation (a cooperative Japan-U.S. organization) that between 90,000 and 166,000 people died in Hiroshima, while another 60,000 to 80,000 died in Nagasaki. These deaths include those who died due to the force and excruciating heat of the explosions as well as deaths caused by acute radiation exposure.

While these numbers represent imprecise estimates. . .statistics regarding the long term effects have been even more difficult to determine.

Though exposure to radiation can cause acute, near-immediate effect by killing cells and directly damaging tissue, radiation can also have effects that happen on longer scale, such as cancer, by causing mutations in the DNA of living cells. Mutations can occur spontaneously, but a mutagen like radiation increases the likelihood of a mutation taking place. . . a cell will either repair the gene, die, or retain the mutation. In order for a mutation to cause cancer, it is believed that a series of mutations must accumulate in a given cell and its progeny. For this reason, it may be many years after exposure before an increase in the incident rate of cancer due to radiation becomes evident.

Among the long-term effects suffered by atomic bomb survivors, the most deadly was leukemia. An increase in leukemia appeared about two years after the attacks and peaked around four to six years later. Children represent the population that was affected most severely. . .

. . .For all other cancers, incidence increase did not appear until around ten years after the attacks. . .

. . .Nearly seventy years after the bombings occurred, most of the generation that was alive during the attack has passed away. Now much more attention has turned to the children born to the survivors. Regarding individuals who had been exposed to radiation before birth (*in utero*), studies. . .have shown that exposure led to increases in small head size and mental disability, as well as impairment in physical growth. Persons exposed *in utero* were also found to have a lower increase in cancer rate than survivors who were children at the time of the attack.

## Document 5

Once [the bomb] had been tested, President Truman faced the decision as to whether to use it. He did not like the idea, but was persuaded that it would shorten the war against Japan and save American lives. It is my opinion that the use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender because of the effective sea blockade and the successful bombing with conventional weapons.

It was my reaction that the scientists and others wanted to make this test because of the vast sums that had been spent on the project. Truman knew that, and so did the other people involved. However, the Chief Executive made a decision to use the bomb on two cities in Japan.

... "Bomb" is the wrong word to use for this new weapon. It is not a bomb. It is not an explosive. It is a poisonous thing that kills people by its deadly radioactive reaction, more than by the explosive force it develops.

The lethal possibilities of atomic warfare in the future are frightening. My own feeling was that in being the first to use it, we had adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages. I was not taught to make war in that fashion, and wars cannot be won by destroying women and children. We were the first to have this weapon in our possession, and the first to use it. There is a practical certainty that potential enemies will have it in the future and that atomic bombs will sometime be used against us...

...Until the United Nations, or some world organization, can guarantee – and have the power to enforce that guarantee- that the world will be spared the terrors of atomic warfare, the United States must have more and better atom bombs than any potential enemy.

Admiral William D. Leahy, chief of staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, *I Was There*. New York: Arno Press, 1979.

## Document 6

The Japanese could be expected to defend their sacred homeland with even greater fervor, and kamikazes flying at short range promised to be even more devastating than at Okinawa. The Japanese had more than 2,000,000 troops in the home islands, were training millions of irregulars, and for some time had been conserving aircraft that might have been used to protect Japanese cities against American bombers.

Reports from Tokyo indicated that Japan meant to fight the war to a finish. On June 8 an imperial conference adopted "The Fundamental Policy to Be Followed Henceforth in the Conduct of the War," which pledged to "prosecute the war to the bitter end in order to uphold the national polity, protect the imperial land, and accomplish the objectives for which we went to war." Truman had no reason to believe that the proclamation meant anything other than what it said.

...Truman met with the chiefs at three-thirty in the afternoon. Present were Army Chief of Staff Gen. George C. Marshall, Army Air Force's Gen. Ira C. Eaker (sitting in for the Army Air Force's chief of staff, Henry H. Arnold, who was on an inspection tour of installations in the Pacific), Navy Chief of Staff Adm. Ernest J. King, Leahy (also a member of the JCS), Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, and Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy. Truman opened the meeting, then asked Marshall for his views. Marshall was the dominant figure on the JCS. He was Truman's most trusted military adviser, as he had been President Franklin D. Roosevelt's.

Marshall reported that the chiefs, supported by the Pacific commanders Gen. Douglas MacArthur and Adm. Chester W. Nimitz, agreed that an invasion of Kyushu "appears to be the least costly worthwhile operation following Okinawa." Lodgment in Kyushu, he said, was necessary to make blockade and bombardment more effective and to serve as a staging area for the invasion of Japan's main island of Honshu. The chiefs recommended a target date of November 1 for the first phase, code-named Olympic, because delay would give the Japanese more time to prepare and because bad weather might postpone the invasion "and hence the end of the war" for up to six months. Marshall said that in his opinion, Olympic was "the only course to pursue."

<https://www.americanheritage.com/biggest-decision-why-we-had-drop-atomic-bomb>

**Document 7** : Excerpts from President Franklin Roosevelt's speech to Congress, December 8, 1941

Mr. Vice President, and Mr. Speaker, and Members of the Senate and House of Representatives: Yesterday, December 7, 1941 -- a date which will live in infamy -- the United States of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and air forces of the Empire of Japan . . . . . It will be recorded that the distance of Hawaii from Japan makes it obvious that the attack was deliberately planned many days or even weeks ago. During the intervening time the Japanese Government has deliberately sought to deceive the United States by false statements and expressions of hope for continued peace. The attack yesterday on the Hawaiian Islands has caused severe damage to American naval and military forces. I regret to tell you that very many American lives have been lost. In addition American ships have been reported torpedoed on the high seas between San Francisco and Honolulu . . . . . No matter how long it may take us to overcome this premeditated invasion, the American people in their righteous might will win through to absolute victory. I believe that I interpret the will of the Congress and of the people when I assert that we will not only defend ourselves to the uttermost but will make it very certain that this form of treachery shall never again endanger us. Hostilities exist. There is no blinking at the fact that our people, our territory, and our interests are in grave danger. With confidence in our armed forces- with the unbounding determination of our people- we will gain the inevitable triumph- so help us God. I ask that the Congress declare that since the unprovoked and dastardly attack by Japan on Sunday, December 7, 1941, a state of war has existed between the United States and the Japanese Empire . . .

Source 7: Translation of leaflet dropped on the Japanese (AB-11), August 6, 1945. Miscellaneous Historical Documents Collection. 258

2. A translation of the above leaflet follows:

TO THE JAPANESE PEOPLE:

America asks that you take immediate heed of what we say on this leaflet.

We are in possession of the most destructive explosive ever devised by man. A single one of our newly developed atomic bombs is actually the equivalent in explosive power to what 2000 of our giant B-29's can carry on a single mission. This awful fact is one for you to ponder and we solemnly assure you it is grimly accurate.

We have just begun to use this weapon against your homeland. If you still have any doubt, make inquiry as to what happened to Hiroshima when just one atomic bomb fell on that city.

Before using this bomb to destroy every resource of the military by which they are prolonging this useless war, we ask that you now petition the Emperor to end the war. Our President has outlined for you the thirteen consequences of an honorable surrender. We urge that you accept these consequences and begin the work of building a new, better, and peace-loving Japan.

You should take steps now to cease military resistance. Otherwise, we shall resolutely employ this bomb and all our other superior weapons to promptly and forcefully end the war.

EVACUATE YOUR CITIES

3. Below is a copy of the second leaflet (AB-12) which was dropped on Japanese cities in conjunction with the Atomic Bomb.

~~SECRET~~  
CLASSIFIED BY SE DATE 12-12-62

DECLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET 5200.10

CLASSIFIED BY SE DATE 12-12-62



TO THE JAPANESE PEOPLE:

America asks that you take immediate heed of what we say on this leaflet.

We are in possession of the most destructive explosive ever devised by man. A single one of our newly developed atomic bombs is actually the equivalent in explosive power to what 2000 of our giant B-29s can carry on a single mission. This awful fact is one for you to ponder and we solemnly assure you it is grimly accurate.

We have just begun to use this weapon against your homeland. If you still have any doubt, make inquiry as to what happened to Hiroshima when just one atomic bomb fell on that city.


Before using this bomb to destroy every resource of the military by which they are prolonging this useless war, we ask that you now petition the Emperor to end the war. Our president has outlined for you the thirteen consequences of an honorable surrender. We urge that you accept these consequences and begin the work of building a new, better and peace-loving Japan.

You should take steps now to cease military resistance. Otherwise, we shall resolutely employ this bomb and all our other superior weapons to promptly and forcefully end the war.

EVACUATE YOUR CITIES.

Source 3: Casualties from World War 2. <http://necrometrics.com/ww2stats.htm>

	Axis Military	Allied Military	Civilians	Europe-North Africa	Asia-Pacific	TOTAL, in millions
<u>Soviet Union</u>		8,668,000	16,900,000	8,660,000	8,000	25.6m
<u>China</u>	240,000	1,757,000	8,000,000		1,997,000	10.0m
<u>Poland</u>		123,000	6,028,000	123,000		6.1m
<u>Germany</u>	3,500,000		1,600,000	3,500,000		5.1m
<u>East Indies</u>			4,000,000			4.0m
<u>Japan</u>	2,566,000		672,000		2,566,000	3.2m
<u>India</u>		49,000	3,000,000	42,000	7,000	3.0m
<u>French Indochina</u>			2,000,000			2.0m
<u>Yugoslavia</u>		305,000	1,200,000	305,000		1.5m
<u>Romania</u>	350,000	170,000	300,000	520,000		0.8m
<u>France</u>	3,000	250,000	350,000	250,000		0.6m
<u>Czechoslovakia</u>	200,000	46,000	294,000	246,000		540,000
<u>Great Britain</u>		403,000	93,000	397,000	6,000	496,000
<u>Italy</u>	280,000	67,000	93,000	347,000		440,000
<u>Hungary</u>	136,000		294,000	136,000		430,000
<u>USA</u>		405,000	9,000	309,000	96,000	414,000
<u>Korea</u>			400,000			400,000
<u>Greece</u>		17,000	325,000	17,000		342,000
<u>Netherlands</u>		8,000	200,000	8,000		208,000
<u>Philippines</u>		27,000	100,000		27,000	127,000
<u>Belgium</u>		9,000	76,000	9,000		85,000
<u>Finland</u>	80,000		3,000	80,000		83,000
	7.3m	12.3m	45.9m	14.9m	4.7m	65.6m




Hiroshima





8 Some of the more obvious short-term injuries to be seen among the survivors of the Hiroshima blast were horrific. This man was suffering from burns



caused by the searing heat of the flash when the atomic bomb exploded. Most patients afflicted with these injuries later also developed the symptoms of radiation sickness.

9 Remaining public buildings in and around Hiroshima were pressed into service as temporary hospitals and shelters for the injured. These burn victims were sheltered in the ruins of a bank. The photographer noted that all the burns had a pronounced reddish appearance.



